IS THE RISE OF CHINA A SECURITY THREAT?
par Bertrand ATEBA
Ph.D. Candidate
School of International Studies, Peking University
The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Empire have undermined much of the
global power structure that has characterized international politics for several decades.
The international system is no longer bipolar. Instead, one superpower is predominant,
with a number of regional powers becoming increasingly important. Enjoying a relatively
stable international environment and with the implementation of the open-door policy,
China has recorded remarkable economic performances. The modernization drive has brought
about tremendous changes in the standard of living of a huge and relatively poor
population. Military capabilities are growing, raising fears of a more assertive China
that is likely to upset the established security order of East Asia. In a word, China is
widely perceived as an ascending power.
The continuing growth of China's economy and the current modernization
and build-up of its military have become a source of open concern for some scholars and
statesmen both in the West and in the regions adjacent to the PRC. The increasing
influence of China in international affairs and her gradual move towards great power
status have caused anxiety to the extent that, how to deal with China is the puzzle of
this new millennium. Not long ago, a certain "China threat" theory appeared in
international politics, and after all these years, the controversy is still going on. Many
predictions have been made about China, but so far, none of them has ever materialized.
The communists leaders are still ruling the country, the economy is still growing, no
neighboring country has been invaded, The Asia Pacific region is still far from being
destabilized by an aggressive China. All these unmaterialized forecasts emphasize the
precariousness of the best thinking in the field of international politics, and the
necessity of their continuous revision as well as the refusal to get locked in unshakable
truths. It is once again demonstrated that the analysis of world politics should be freed
from dogma.
A threat is defined as a warning that one is going to hurt or punish.
Another definition considers a threat to be a sign of possible danger. These definitions
fit well with the different considerations stemming from the abundant literature on the
China Threat theory. Every aspect of the existence of the PRC as a political entity is
seen as a possible danger. Because of the defense modernization, the increase of the
defense budget and the recent Taiwan Straits crisis, for some, China is a military threat.
Because China has adopted a political system different from the liberal democracy existing
in the West, some have concluded that China is a political threat.
The emergence of Chinese nationalism is also seen as advocating international aggression.
In his 1993 assessment of the emerging international order, Kenneth Waltz wrote that
" economic competition is often as keen as military competition, and since nuclear
weapons limit the use of force among great powers at the strategic level, we may expect
economic and technological competition among them to become more intense" (WALTZ,
1993: 45-73). Samuel Huntington similarly claimed that " in the coming years, the
principal conflicts of interests involving the United States and the major powers are
likely to be over economic issues"(HUNGTINGTON, 1993: 68-83). From these two views,
there is a coming economic conflict with China. From a theoretical base, and especially
the theory of power transition developed by Organski (ORGANSKI: 1958), some are quick to
admit that with the rise of China, there is an impending power transition in favor of an
undemocratic challenger and that is likely to induce a belligerent response from the
democratic leader and its associates.
There are other arguments that China is still a weak and poor country
facing serious internal challenges that might jeopardize her move towards superpower
status. For the proponents of this view, the China Threat is unlikely to materialize.
China seems locked in a kind of vicious circle as both its rise and collapse are a matter
of anxiety for regional and global security.
This article intends to demonstrate that China is hunger for power,
more for historical reasons than for hegemonic ambitions. Any attempt by any country,
whether big or small, weak or powerful to block the way leading China to superpower
status, will be considered by the Chinese government and people as a new kind of
humiliation inflicted upon their country. The consequence will then be a strong
nationalism advocating xenophobia, aggression and revenge. Without denying the existence
of a China Threat, I argue that the international community has more to fear for regional
and global security from a weak and disintegrating China, than from a strong and powerful
one. This article finds that, instead of demonizing China, the international society in
order to eliminate the looming threat from China should rather help and assist it to rise
to power. For China is a dissatisfied power seeking a " place at the
table"(BERNSTEIN and MUNRO, 1997), containing and blocking China's rise will do no
good to regional and world stability. As long as China does not regain its lost prestige
of old, and feels weak and vulnerable, the international community should not expect a
good citizen China. This article begins with an evaluation of the different arguments
developed in respect with the China Threat theory. It goes on to discuss these various
arguments, and later draws conclusions stressing the necessity for the international
community to integrate, accommodate and understand a country in search of its glorious
past.
THE PROPONENTS OF THE CHINA THREAT THEORY
The China Threat theory appeared for the first time at the beginnings of the 1990s, when
China's economy and comprehensive national strength experienced unprecedented fast growth.
In August 1990, a Japanese professor wrote an article describing China as a potential
adversary in view of its comprehensive national strength and sustained development (MURAI,
1990). In 1992, the China economic threat theory also emerged following the late Chinese
leader Deng Xiaoping's tour of South China which provided the launch for the known
economic growth. Western countries, while generally showing appreciation of China's
economic achievements, also worried that it would become a competitor for world markets,
funds and resources, and even worse, provide more resources for China's military
expansion. This economic threat theory was first raised by South Korea and was echoed by
Japan and the United States.
The National People's Congress adopted on February 25th 1992,the Law on
the Territorial Sea of the PRC, confirming a claim of sovereignty over some islands in the
South and East China Seas. Many interpreted this as a sign that China was pushing for
military expansionism and attempting to become a regional hegemon. The Japanese media
claimed that the modernization process of the Chinese navy revealed China's marine
hegemonism strategy in the twenty first century. The US media also carried stories
declaring that China was expanding outside its territory, its military might was growing
fast, and that China aimed to dominate East Asia.
In 1993, a Harvard University professor(HUNGTINGTON, 1993) published an article in which
he argued that the fundamental source of conflict in this post-cold war era will not be
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the
dominating source of conflict will be cultural. He goes on to conclude that, the primary
adversary of Western civilization was Islam and Confucianism, which joined hands to
challenge Western values and power. For Huntington, centrally important to the development
of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power
and its means to create military power. Almost without exception, Western countries are
reducing their military power; under Yeltsin's leadership, so also is Russia. China, North
Korea and several Middle Eastern countries however, are significantly expanding their
military capabilities
China is increasing its military spending, developing
long-range missiles and power-projection capabilities, and trying to purchase an aircraft
carrier. China is also exporting arms and weapons technology to countries such as Iraq,
Libya, Iran and Pakistan. A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into
being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons
technologies needed to counter the military power of the West. In order to deter the
Confucian-Islamic coalition, Huntington proposes the West to limit the expansion of the
military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western
military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to
exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other
civilizations groups sympathetic to the Western values and interests; to strengthen
international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values, and
to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.
In another development, the Wen Ho Lee spy case at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory is another accusation that China is posing an " acute
intelligence threat" to the US government's nuclear weapons laboratories. A secret
report to top Clinton administration officials in November 1998 said that " China is
an advanced nuclear power yet its nuclear stockpile is deteriorating. As such, China has
specifically targeted US labs for the collection of technical intelligence related to the
design of nuclear weapons" the report concludes, " this effort has been very
successful and Beijing's exploitation of US national laboratories has substantially aided
its nuclear weapons program".
With the latest rise of Chinese nationalism, some US media claim an
anti-Western stance is the primary characteristic of the national identity of China, which
is especially strong when faced with any suggestion of an external threat. China new
nationalism emerged in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest. Beijing
launched a relentless campaign against "counter-revolutionary rebellion". The
campaign quickly widened to target the countries that were isolating Beijing for its
bloody crushing of the pro-democracy protests, especially the US. The China nationalism
threat emerged from these considerations .
Other threat theories include arguments on China's food crisis, rural
crisis, population crisis, resources crisis and environment crisis. These various crisis,
it is said, will make the country a heavy burden to the entire world. The logic is that
Chinese people should never climb out of poverty and become rich. If they do so, the world
would experience shortages of food, resources and damage to the environment.
Many of the sentiments of the various threats are contained in a book
published in 1997 under the provocative title "The Coming Conflict With
China"(BERSTEIN and MUNRO, 1997). The authors' thesis is that if the United States,
the only political, economic, military and cultural power in the post-cold war period,
wants to maintain and develop these superiorities in the next century, it must get a clear
understanding of the various challenges it faces and defeat them. One of these challenges
comes from the European Union, but this is mainly economic, and is not so threatening
because the E.U. and the United States have similar historical and cultural traditions,
life-styles and value concepts. The second challenge comes from Japan, and is also mainly
economic. In addition, Japan will compromise under American pressure because it needs US
military protection and because of its vast domestic market. Only China poses a genuinely
serious threat because it differs greatly from the United States in cultural traditions,
life-style and value concepts. For Bernstein and Munro, war is inevitable between China
and the US. China's goal of achieving paramount status in Asia conflicts with an
established American objective: preventing any single country from gaining overwhelming
power in Asia. The United States, after all, has been in major wars in Asia three times in
the past half century, always to prevent a single power from gaining ascendancy, although
at a cost of declining American military prestige. Given the fact that over the next
decade or two China will become the dominant power in Asia, conflict with the US could
occur over a number of issues, headed by a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan by force or to
resolve by military means its territorial claims in the South China sea. China's
technological and political help to the Islamic countries of Central Asia and North
Africa, and its looming dominance in East Asia put it at the center of an informal network
of states, many of which have goals and philosophies inimical to the United States, and
many of which share China's sense of grievance at the long global domination of the West.
For some, the United States is declining while China is in the process
of catching up. This view fuels speculation about power transition, which is supposed to
increase the danger of war. This danger has been hypothesized to be especially great when
the challenger is an undemocratic or illiberal state(SHWELLER, 1992: 235-269). According
to this formulation, democracies are generally satisfied powers, which are unlikely to
challenge the international status quo. Because other democracies are presumed to also
support this order, changes in relative power among democracies are not seen to be
especially alarming. A power transition in favor of an undemocratic challenger, however,
is likely to be treated as more threatening to this order. In theory Organski (ORGANSKI,
1958) shows that, wars occur when a great power in a secondary position challenges the top
nation and its allies for control. Thus the usual major conflict is between the top nation
(and its allies) and the challenger that is about to catch up with it in power. Peace is
only possible when those possessing preponderant power are in firm control and are
satisfied with the status quo. Peace is threatened whenever a powerful nation is
dissatisfied with the status quo and is powerful enough to attempt to change things in the
face of opposition from those who control the existing international order. Degree of
power and degree of satisfaction, then, become important national characteristics to be
considered when trying to locate the nations that are most likely to disturb world peace.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CHINA THREAT THEORY
For Denny Roy (ROY, 1998: 218-219), it must be recognized before we go any further that
China faces immense internal challenges on the road to superpower status. These include
environmental degradation, continued population growth and loss of arable land, rising
crime and civil disorder, discontent among peasant who remain in the fields, a wave of
uncontrolled migration of other peasants into the cities, widespread corruption among
officials, high inflation, the reluctant privatization of unprofitable state-owned
industries, separatist pressures in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, and regionalism in
the other provinces. Political instability, an economic slowdown or a devolution of
central control into some type of federalism or even a commonwealth of autonomous states
might preclude the possibility of a strong China capable of coercing its neighbors. The
basis of a China Threat might therefore never materialize. To take another perspective,
China could be a threat to East Asian security without being a military superpower. A
country does not have to be dominant to commit acts that are destabilizing. Even
relatively weak countries can be troublemakers if they choose to be.
For Samuel Kim (SAMUEL, 1992), just as Japan is seen as a wallet in
search of a global role, China has become an empty seat on the United Nations Security
Council searching for a new national identity. Suddenly, Beijing is unsure of its place in
a world no longer dominated by superpower rivalry and the country is in the grip of an
unprecedented legitimacy-identity crisis. If China is to become a global power, it must
beef up its national power, especially in high technology industries. China is extremely
weak in this area. The post-Tiananmen government is paralyzed by megacrisis, multiple and
interlocking crises of authority, identity, motivation, and ideology. These have converged
at a time when the center is fractured by another round of a deadly intraelite power
struggle and is also facing challenges from an assertive civil society, peripheral but
booming southern coastal provinces, and ethno nationalistic movements of non-Han minority
peoples in the strategic borderlands of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia. Against such trends
and pressures Chinese State sovereignty is a paper tiger. China is a weak, if not yet
disintegrating state. How can the wobbly edifice of the Chinese State survive the multiple
threats from within? Can a weak, oppressive state be expected to act as a responsible and
peace-loving regional power? The once widely shared image of a China in disintegration and
of a dragon rampant in Japan and Southeast Asia seems to be moving perilously close to
reality.
For Michael Yahuda (YAHUDA, 1999), The PRC has made great strides to
join the modern world since beginning the process of reform and opening-up. Moreover, the
Chinese leaders have gone a long way to establish a peaceful international environment
within the region, which is conducive to China's main task of developing its economy. But
China's approach to its maritime territories is still unnerving to the extent that the
neighbors seek the assurance of support from the US. China has not yet reached the point
of sufficient transparency at home to allow it to be truly integrated into the
international community. In addition China is still in the middle of a vast transformation
that has a long way to go before it can be said to have run its course. Hence in its
foreign relations, as well as in its domestic affairs, it is true to say that despite the
enormous progress that has been registered, many deep-seated problems remain and for the
time being, the region and the wider world have more to fear from a China that can act as
a " spoiler " than from any leadership that a still relatively weak China could
possibly hope to provide.
THERE IS NO POWER TRANSITION
China's capabilities have indeed increased recently and at a rather fast pace. These
increases, however, reflect expansion from relatively modest bases, and become
comparatively small when considered in per capita terms. Moreover, whether considered in
terms of their economic, technological, or military dimensions, these capabilities tend to
be more impressive quantitatively than qualitatively. Although China's economy has been
growing rapidly, it is still a developing country. According to Scalapino (SCALAPINO,
1993: 219), even assuming China achieves its economic goal, its per capita income in the
year 2000 will only be about U.S. $900. China still lacks significant capabilities to
project its forces abroad. Its military technologies lag seriously behind those of the U.S
and Japan. Therefore, China is not about to overtake the U.S in either economic or
military terms. The impending power transition is illusory. Here is a numerical comparison
:
US strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting China: 6000
Chinese strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the U.S.:
About 20
Total U.S nuclear weapons (deployment, reserve or awaiting
dismantlement): 12070
Total Chinese nuclear weapons: 400
US ICBMs: 550
Chinese ICBMs: 18-24
U.S long-range strategic bombers: 174
Chinese long-range strategic bombers: 0
U.S ballistic missile submarines: 18
Chinese ballistic missile submarine: 1
U.S Gross domestic Product: $ 8.1 trillion
Chinese gross Domestic Product: $ 639 billion
U.S military budget: $ 270 billion
Chinese military budget: $ 36.6 billion
U.S aircraft carriers: 11 (plus one in refit)
Chinese aircraft carriers: 0
In addition to this military superiority, the U.S has a
well-established network of military alliances throughout Asia Pacific and has stationed
troops and equipment ready for a quick deployment if necessary. In order for China to
become a threat to the regional balance of power, it would have to develop the military
strength to contend with the other great powers and the power projection capabilities to
influence developments across the open seas. The Chinese government is aware that
"
a wise challenger, growing in power through internal development, would hold
back from threatening the existing international order until it had reached a point where
it was as powerful as the dominant nation and its allies, for surely it would seem foolish
to attack while weaker than the enemy"(ORGANSKI, 1958).
THERE ARE REASONS FOR CHINA'S MILITARY BUILD UP AND SEARCH FOR POWER.
China has a history as one of the oldest, most sophisticated, and most powerful countries
in the world. Four thousand years ago, under the semi legendary Emperor Yu of the Hsia
dynasty, the Chinese built irrigation channels, domesticated animals, engaged in
cultivation, and established a written language. Through fourteen Chinese dynasties, China
built a civilization marked by great cultural and engineering feats, The Great Wall of
China, the only human creation visible from space was begun in about 210 B.C. The great
philosophy of Confucianism was soon thereafter established. China also exercised wide
political influence, holding sway over a considerable regional area. The technical
innovations China gave the world not only included printing, paper, the magnetic compass
and gunpowder, but also among other things, the modern horse collar, the watertight ship
compartment, canal locks, suspension and segmented bridges.
By the mid-nineteenth century, a decaying China was ripe for invasion, exploitation and
the carving up into spheres of influence by the European powers. Huge tracts of the
Chinese territory were seized by the Russians, the island of Formosa was taken by Japan in
1945, and various European countries and Japan came close to making China a colony
dividing it up into zones of interest that they dominated. China underwent what was to the
Chinese, a hundred years of humiliation. Following the Qing dynasty's collapse in 1911,
China was torn apart by fighting between rival warlords ruling different areas of the
country. By the 1930s, China had become a poor, underdeveloped country. Under Kuomintang
(Nationalist) rule from 1927, the country was largely reunified, but there was a
persistent civil war waged for most of the following two decades with the emerging
communists, aggravated by Japanese invasion, that resulted in virtual economic collapse.
The humiliation inflicted on the Chinese by this fall from previous greatness combined
with the century of confusion and despair, rankles to this day in the national psyche. It
is the constant theme of speeches by the present leadership, along with reminders that it
was only under Communist Party leadership that the Chinese people were, in the words of
Chairman Mao able to " stand up " and become masters of their own house again.
Since the founding of the PRC, China's foreign policy has always attached primary
importance to safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security,
and has been working hard for a peaceful international and a favorable peripheral
environment for China's socialist modernization drive. It is clear that China is a
dissatisfied power. It has a number of outstanding territorial claims that it wants
recognized by its neighbors, and it seeks veto over Taiwan's international activities. It
exerts less influence than it wants in the regional balance of power and in the
international nonproliferation trade, and human rights regimes. The PRC 's security
remains hostage to the behavior of potential adversaries and unreliable neighbors hosting
foreign troops or with alliances with the remaining superpower. To the Chinese leadership,
hegemonism and power politics still exist and are developing further in the international
political, economic, and security spheres. Certain big powers are pursuing "
neo-interventionism ", " neo-gunboat policy ", and neo-economic
colonialism, which are seriously damaging the sovereignty, independence and developmental
interests of many countries, and threatening world peace and security .
The military modernization and the search for power embody the Chinese historical
awareness that, weakness, disunity, and disorder at home would invite foreign aggression
and result in the loss of Chinese identity, as China's century-long humiliation and
suffering demonstrated. In theory it is said that, " if a state seems weak, it could
invite attack" (KELLER and KLEIN, 1999: 178). The development and powerfulness of
China should be seen as an effort trying to catch up and as an attempt to bring its
historical search for security to a satisfactory conclusion. International politics has
been called "politics in the absence of government" (FOX, 1959: 35). In theory,
and as demonstrated by Waltz, to achieve their objectives and maintain their security,
units in a condition of anarchy, be they people, corporations, states, or whatever must
rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves.
Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order. A self-help system
is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than
others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of
such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the
creation of balances of power.
There is a regional phenomenon in which the fastest-growing economies are busily buying
weapons. Most countries in East Asia, including Japan and Taiwan have been acquiring
advanced weapons. Why should China refrain from doing the same if it can now afford
sophisticated weapons? Why is the Chinese military modernization so alarming? China does
not station troops or set up military bases in any foreign country. China does not seek
alliance with any country or bloc of countries, nor does it participate in any military
bloc. China stresses self-reliance as the basis for safeguarding state security, and
insists on making national defense policies and development strategies independently .
Analysts who see China as a present or future threat to its neighbors
often, and mistakenly, assume a direct connection between capabilities and intentions, and
between hardware numbers and fighting capabilities. A growing military budget,
improvements in weapons produced or purchased, and increasing numbers of ships and planes
may be explained in several ways besides a menacing intention: as a consequence of
bureaucratic competition and influence; as a "natural" outgrowth of increased
national prosperity; as a response to perceived external threat to or rivalry with China;
and as a normal step in modernizing weapons and equipment. Analysts need to be cautious
about attributing malevolence to one country's military build up without at least
considering the same about other countries. It would be interesting to know why the same
people who believe China with its weak defense industrial base, poor-quality weapons, and
low military spending, is a threat to the international order, whereas the United States
and Japan, with huge military expenditures relative to China and enormous defense
industrial base and in the case of the US, a doctrinal commitment to global order and
military bases and forces worldwide; and in Japan's case, the largest economic stake in
Asia of any country, a history of aggression in Asia, are not.
Under the disguise of " humanitarianism" and " human rights", some
countries are frequently resorting to the use or threat of force, in flagrant violation of
the UN charter and all established international norms governing international relations.
The NATO, in total ignorance of the UN Security Council principles, launched military
attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
CHINA IS ALSO THREATENED
With the collapse of the USSR, the United States is the only foreign power capable of
directly threatening China's security, blocking the PRC 's projection of its power,
preventing unification with Taiwan, and even undermining the edifice of Chinese socialism
from within just as Soviet revisionism once was perceived as attempting to do. Only the
United States has the network of forward-deployed military forces, alliances, and weapons
recipients in East Asia that can contain China; the information and financial resources
with which to press its human-rights agenda on China; the ability to impose major
sanctions on China; and the worldwide influence to whip up a " China threat "
fever. The United States and Japan find it necessary to find some kind of common enemy to
maintain stability in their relations. The security alliance is the foundation for
US-Japanese relations and a major adhesive for bolstering that alliance is a common enemy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union eroded that foundation, and China is therefore the
logical candidate to cement the Japano-American security alliance. For the Chinese, the US
has also tried to make the reunification of China an unfulfilled dream, and impose its
value concepts on China for dramatic changes in the country, just like those in Eastern
Europe. Through what is known as "peaceful evolution", America is slowly
introducing its values into China, with the intention to destabilize China from within in
the long run. To erode the legitimacy of the Communist Party, to encourage activities
aiming at splitting China, and backing Taiwan's independence, are part of a broad US
strategy to contain and keep China down. A fundamental reason for the constant tensions in
US-China relations is structural: an established power is attempting to induce a rising
power to comply with its preferred norms.
The rising nationalism in vogue in China, should not therefore come as a surprise, as we
can see from this quotation: "Developing countries in particular, faced with threats
and aggression from large powers, must embrace patriotism to resist any pressure from
outside
Given recent US-led attempts to westernize and split China by some Western
countries, China needs more than ever to unite and promote patriotism
The more
patriotism is promoted, the faster China can develop; and the more closely the Chinese
people are united, the more likely attempts to contain China will fail" (MING, 1996:
8). Chinese nationalism, far from being threatening, is just an indispensable way for the
Chinese people to hold their nation together, protect their identity and advance their
interests in a turbulent modern world.
China is not as secure as we think, without aircraft carriers, Chinese battleships and
patrol boats operating beyond coastal waters are easy targets for the land-based aircraft
of local powers, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, and the carrier-based
aircraft of the United States. Since China will likely not possess its first
limited-capability aircraft carrier until 2010, it is hard to imagine that the United
States could lose its naval supremacy in the western pacific within even a quarter
century, even if it stood still while China advanced, unless it choose to withdraw from
the region.
THE REAL CHINA THREAT
By many standards, China is already a great power. Its vast landmass, large population,
wealth of natural resources, large industrial base, and strategic location give it the raw
materials from which national power has traditionally been constructed. China possesses a
large standing army, armed with nuclear weapons, whose projection capabilities will
probably increase in the years ahead. In a cultural sense, there is a greater China that
includes the powerful overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania.
Economically, there is a greater China that includes Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Greater
China is implicitly acknowledged by China's smaller neighbors. While these states will
like the US to remain engaged in the affairs of the region as a counterbalance to China,
they have chosen to treat China as it is perceived: the most important modernizing
phenomenon in East Asia. Although it is not a global superpower, China has great influence
outside Asia. Primarily through participation in the international arms market. As a large
developing country, China can claim common identity with much of the third world , and as
a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Peking is guaranteed a place in
deliberations of major international issues, as well as a veto over the Council's
decisions. China's quest to become a great China has its roots in poverty, insecurity and
disunity.
The greater China described above, is not the China that is threatening
regional and global peace. In the contrary, it is a China that is aware of its
responsibility to bring its contribution in shaping a free, stable and equal New World.
China does not seek regional domination. What China wants is recognition as an important
power with regional interests to protect and the capability to influence international
politics. In a multipolar world that is increasingly being shaped by interdependent forces
and multilateral institutions, the objective of international politics must be to
establish lasting conditions of common security for all countries, rather than to promote
one country's or bloc's security at the expense of another's. China's rise to power is an
irreversible process and as noted by a former US Secretary of State, "no force could
hold back the rise of a new power" (KISSINGER, 1996). No matter how the United States
treats China, it can never stop the more and more important role of the country in future
international affairs. When will the US and its allies understand that containing and
blocking Chinese power increase the risk of war? The more China will feel excluded from
the shaping of the international order, greater is the risk of the collapse of such an
order if China decides to act as a " spoiler ". There are issues over which
China will never offer any room for concessions and will never rule out the use of
military force to assert its interests. China will continue to mould the People's
Liberation Army into a highly effective force capable of making its presence felt in the
surrounding region if need be.
According to the theory of power transition, as long as a challenger of an existing
international order, remains outside that dominant international order, and has hopes of
overturning it or taking over its leadership through combat, such a nation is a serious
threat to world peace. It is the powerful and dissatisfied nations that start world wars.
China has already put forth its own ideas about a new international order. The Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are proposed as its " foundation ". The
continuing refusal of the West to integrate these principles in the new international
order is not a very good option. The United States and other countries such as Japan need
to accept China's insistence on equality and respect for sovereignty, which underlie its
claims to senior status in the post-cold war Asia Pacific order. It is imperative for
China, the United States and Japan to establish a security relationship of mutual trust
and stability. As demonstrated in the past, such a relationship serves the peace,
stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. When the Japan and US joined forces
in the confrontation with China, the region witnessed two large-scale wars in Korea and
Indochina. When the United States and Japan opted to cooperate with China, however, peace
and prosperity dawned, which eventually nourished an economic miracle: the rise of East
Asia. A constructive and cooperative relationship among the three nations, therefore is a
public asset contributing to the region's stability and prosperity. For the sake of peace,
the West should let China rise and fulfill its secular ambition to stand on its own feet
and win the respect that its growing power entitles it.
WHY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD HELP CHINA TO BECOME STRONG
It is my conviction that a disintegrating China poses the greatest risk to regional and
global security. China is still in the middle of a long modernization process. The success
of this process still depend on forces of global and regional economic integration and on
foreign assistance. China's prosperity is actually very fragile, as there are a lot of
internal problems that need cooperation and assistance from foreign countries. China's
booming economy upon which the legitimacy and stability of the central government
increasingly rest, relies on close economic, managerial, and technological connections to
the outside world, especially to the US and Asia. Continued high economic growth rates and
contacts with the outside world are essential to the success of China's military
modernization effort, which stands at the center of its comprehensive strategy for coping
with the post-cold war security environment and will likely have major implications for
Asia's future peace and stability. The economic reforms underway, have created a long list
of actually or potentially destabilizing conditions within China. These include the
decentralization of economic decision-making power to the provinces and lower levels,
exacerbating long-standing central-local tensions over revenue sharing and local
nationalism; the unequal development of China's regions, with resulting large income,
technology, and growth gaps; social problems brought on or enlarged by contradictions
between central planning and the market, such as double-digit inflation and unemployed
urban workers in debt-ridden state-run enterprises; large-scale environmental problems ;
and increasing corruption, crime, and social disorder. Ultimately if not immediately, all
these problems have broad political implications for the stability of China's party-state
system.
Beijing's fears over social unrest stalled attempts at deepening
economic reforms during most of 1999. The leadership is on the horns of a dilemma. It must
slow down any economic reform that radically worsens unemployment. Yet if it slows down
economic growth the leadership may be destroying one of the pillars of its own legitimacy.
Any degree of fragmentation or instability in China caused by economic difficulties will
affect the region. It is in the interests of China's neighbors to provide the capital and
expertise as well as lend any cooperation they can as China finally begins to tackle its
fundamental economic challenges. In the long term, China's entry into the WTO will serve
as a catalyst for state own enterprises (SOE) reform by forcing China's SOEs to speed up
reform for their survival in market competition. In the short term, however, WTO entry may
be more harmful than helpful in that many SOEs will be unable to compete against high
quality foreign products. This will likely result in additional bankruptcies and even more
unemployment. China has made significant contributions to regional security by playing a
positive role in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, preventing regional nuclear
proliferation, and establishing confidence-building measures. China could also have major
negative effects on the security of the region through massive migration, a rise in drug
trafficking and increased pollution. The degree of domestic stability or instability is
directly linked with these negative factors. If China's SOEs reform does not succeed,
further workers will be laid off, regionalism (in China) would rise, and separatist
movements in some areas would escalate. Thus the success or failure of SOE reform is an
important factor in affecting the domestic stability and Asian-Pacific security. Because
China faces so many internal problems and many nations in the Asia-Pacific region and in
the West have experience in managing similar problems, there is ample opportunity for
other countries to share their expertise with China. Such cooperation may create an
atmosphere that could be extended to more sensitive realms of security as nuclear
non-proliferation and border disputes. Some possible suggestions for cooperation with
China on SOE reform include: increased foreign investment in SOEs as allowed by new
regulations; sharing modern management techniques to establish SOEs along corporate lines;
and assistance in the establishment of a new social security net in China.
Those analysts who really worry about regional and global order that a
greater China is supposed to upset should rather think about how to help the Chinese
communist government to keep control over the country by reinforcing its legitimacy,
deterring separatist activities, controlling China's borders and raising the standards of
living of a huge population. A threat from a powerful China is less worrying than a threat
from a weak and disintegrating one.
WHAT CHINA SHOULD ALSO KNOW
Ethnicities more powerful than indigenous peoples are demanding greater participation in
governmental decision making within existing states. Others are fighting for states of
their own. The break-up of the Soviet Union provides a compelling precedent. Virtually
every country in the world is experiencing some form of increased political pressure from
its underrepresented groups; examples include French-speaking people in Canada, Scots in
the United Kingdom, Tibetans in China, Kashmiri Muslims in India, Latinos in the United
States, and Muslims in Norway. More demanding nationalists in some ethnic groups are using
violence to achieve their own state; such as Kurds in Turkey, Basques in Spain, Chechins
in Russia, Tamils in Sri-Lanka, Hutus in Burundi, and Abkhazis in Georgia. Lists could go
on and on of examples in both categories of ethnic group assertiveness; that is those
wanting sovereignty, and those wanting more power within existing states. For states to
remain viable, they will have to establish more effective political processes for
accommodating the interests of their less powerful ethnic groups. If they cannot, then
various forms of autonomy will be invented or more parts of the world will fragment into
ministates .
According to the " Security Dilemma " theory, governments
have to decide how much military power is enough to deter potential aggressors. If they
increase their force capability too much, it will threaten other states in the region
that, in turn, may well build up their own military forces. The result is the same or less
security than existed originally. Any expansion in military forces can be seen as an
aggressive act by a potential enemy. In a context of distrust and conflicting interests,
it can produce an arms race and destabilize the existing balance of power. Instability
emphasizes mutual fears and hostile perceptions, which become reinforced by a cycle of
actions and reactions. Chinese decision-makers who would pursue PRC interests by engaging
in threatening and destabilizing behavior, even toward " Chinese " territory,
need to be restrained. Thus, with respect to Taiwan, the PRC has every right to demand
that foreign countries stop antagonizing a delicate situation by selling advanced weapons
to Taiwan. Chinese leaders also must come to accept, however, that Taiwan, while not a
sovereign state, has international standing and is entitled to a greater measure of
international recognition. Taiwan as a part of China, might be admitted to membership in
the ASEAN Regional Forum and become a dialogue partner of China and ASEAN in the search
for a new modus vivendi based on " One China" and the non-use of force.
Today China still needs to learn the advanced technologies and economic
management experience with a different aim of peaceful coexistence and equality with the
West. Only by insisting on rational, not blind, nationalism and through contacts with and
learning from the West can China accelerate its steps towards prosperity with a low cost.
And this requires all Chinese to view the policies towards China of the West headed by the
US with reason and try to avoid blind opposition to everything foreign. After all, "
weak Chinese leadership and institutions will continue to plague international cooperation
on a wide range of issues " said Nathan and Ross (ANDREW and ROBERT, 1997: 231).
The Chinese leadership should learn as we have seen in Korea and
Taiwan, that as the purchasing power of the people rises, they tend to demand more
political freedom. Psychologists have demonstrated that satisfaction implies more want.
After more than two decades of economic reforms, it is now high time to think of political
reforms. People are getting more and more interested to know how public affairs are
managed within the communist party. They want to participate in the decision-making
process and want the leaders to be accountable to them.
By ending its isolation and joining the community of states, China was ready to accept the
rules and feel the influence of that community. The introduction of foreign values in the
Chinese society is unstoppable. Even without a " black hand " behind,
globalization, the Internet phenomenon, the presence of large numbers of foreigners in
China, are all introducing a new culture into China's old traditions. Economic dependence
on foreign markets, capital, and technologies carried the danger of political
interference.
CONCLUSION:
The world needs a strong, confident, proud, secure and stable China to help shape the 21st
century to productive and humane ends. With China as an adversary, achieving this
objective is less likely. To ensure regional and global peace, let us have a competitive,
caring and confident country in which poverty will have been eliminated. China would be
fully integrated into the world economy as a customer, supplier and investor, and with a
greater weight and voice in international institutions. This would be built on its own
existing growing strengths: a high rate of savings, its pragmatic reforms, a disciplined
and relatively well-educated work-force, and the rich overseas Chinese eager to invest in
the country of their ethnic and cultural origin. The international community should give
Beijing the voice it seeks in drawing up the rules of the emerging post-cold war
international order, always remember the historical and current forces that have and are
shaping modern China. A strong China has shown its commitment to regional peace by solving
different border disputes with neighboring countries, participating in the regional
institutions for confidence-building measures. China has participated in the UN
peacekeeping activities, it has compromised on many issues in US-China relations to
diminish the potential for costly conflict with the United States.
A China with weakening central authority, unable to control its borders or its economy and
possibly beset by civil war, presents the greatest insecurity to the rest of Asia. In that
case, huge problems of out-migration, security of investments, and ethnic-nationalist
border wars would have to be anticipated, the Asia-Pacific region will have to deal with
refugees and displaced people. To avoid this sad scenario to turn into reality, the
international community and especially China's neighbors have great interest in helping
China to get stronger and powerful. The rise of China is not a threat, but its
disintegration or the attempt by the international community to block its rise or keep it
down, will bring nothing but disorder and instability.