ANTI-AMERICANISMS IN WORLD POLITICS
par Robert O. Keohane
Princeton University
In 1941 Henry Luce spoke of the coming of "the American
century." Today commentators across the political spectrum emphasize America's
dominant military capabilities and economic strength. Yet after sixty years of global
leadership, the United States is far from universally admired worldwide. A series of polls
taken in the winter of 2004 showed that in 16 of 22 countries surveyed, a plurality or
majority of the public said that the United States had mainly a negative influence in the
world. What is commonly called "anti-Americanism" - the expression of negative
attitudes toward the United States - has spread far and wide, including in parts of the
world where publics showed deep sympathy with the United States after the 9/11 attacks.
The sensitivity of Americans to these expressions of dislike may say as
much about America as about others' views of the United States. Alexis de Tocqueville
commented on this subject in the mid 19th century: The Americans, in their
intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of
praise... They unceasingly harass you to extort praise, and if you resist their entreaties
they fall to praising themselves. It would seem as if, doubting their own merit, they
wished to have it constantly exhibited before their eyes.
The undeniable upsurge in the expression of anti-American sentiment
abroad since 2002 has led to anxieties among many Americans. It is not obvious, however,
whether these sentiments are primarily a reaction to the Bush administration and its
policies or whether they derive from more fundamental sources. As a way of distinguishing
between fundamental and ephemeral sources of anti-Americanism, I wish to begin with a
distinction between disliking "what America is" and "what America
does." This distinction will lead to my first major theme, which is to distinguish
among opinion, distrust, and bias.
My second major theme is signaled by the title of this lecture:
"Anti-Americanisms in world politics." My argument will be that we cannot
understand anti-Americanism as if it were a single, unitary phenomenon. On the contrary,
there are several major types of anti-Americanism, which have quite different sources and
probably different effects as well. The third and last section of my remarks will sketch
an argument about what Professor Katzenstein and I call the "polyvalence" of
American society. Ultimately, we view anti Americanism as rooted in Americanism.
I - Opinion, Distrust, and Bias
We view anti-Americanism as a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United
States and of American society in general. Anti-Americanism is therefore an attitude. At
two extremes of a continuum, attitudes can be characterized merely by opinion, or by bias.
When we think about expressions of opinion toward the United States,
three standard results can be quickly summarized.
First, until shortly before the invasion of Iraq, many more respondents
worldwide had favorable opinions of the United States than unfavorable. In a global poll
taken in the spring and summer of 2002 poll, pluralities in 35 of 42 countries expressed
favorable views. The big exception even then was the Middle East. Since early 2003, public
views toward the United States have turned sharply negative, with the biggest swing from
positive to negative in Europe, and the lowest absolute readings in the Middle East.
Second, individuals' views toward America are multidimensional. Very
few people hate all aspects of American. Indeed, many people seem to like and loath the
United States and American society, at the same time.
Third, attitudes toward the United States differ a great deal from
region to region. Indeed, there is so much variation by country and region that it is more
accurate to speak of anti Americanisms than of anti-Americanism.
To understand anti-Americanism, we have to keep in mind all three big
facts: the long-term favourable orientation of most people toward the United States,
followed by the sharp turn downward between the spring of 2002 and the spring of 2003;
multidimensionality - or what is commonly called ambivalence - and regional heterogeneity.
These big facts tell us that the United States is not hated widely, although it may be
distrusted; that the United States is not hated simply because it is "Mr. Big,"
and that recent American foreign policy is at least part of the story.
The complexity of attitudes toward America is worth emphasizing. There
is a perhaps apocryphal story about the Iranian students who participated in the holding
of American hostages in 1979, asking how, after the crisis was over, they could obtain
visas to the United States. "Yankee, go home - and take me with you!" Polling
data support the view expressed in this story. In Islamic countries, respondents give much
more positive responses to questions about American science and technology, or popular
culture, than about American political institutions or foreign policies.
Ambivalence is also reflected in the fact that in many countries,
people simultaneously express dislike for America while they say that people who move
there are better off as a result.
While opinion may or may not have serious consequences, distrust and
bias should be of serious concern to policy-makers, particularly if these negative
predispositions become deeply entrenched in societies that are important to the United
States. For distrust can translate easily into opposition or lack of support of the United
States. They are likely to demand more evidence, or more compensation, from the United
States before they are willing to support American policies. These demands are costly.
People who not only distrust the United States but are also biased will process
information differently than unbiased people. A recent report shows that Indonesian and
Egyptian members of different focus groups list U.S. aid given to their countries during
the last decade erroneously in the millions, rather than as $ 1 billion and $ 7.3 billion,
respectively. That is, they underestimate it by two to three orders of magnitude.
Furthermore, biased individuals are more likely to attribute bad policies to essential
features of the United States, rather than merely to specific situations. They will tend
to discount potentially favourable information and make negative information more salient.
Some authors distinguish correctly between opinion and bias but then
make the error of accepting polling data as "expressions of anti-Americanism."
Clearly we need better evidence than this before concluding that anti-Americanism in the
sense of deep distrust or bias is widespread. Andrei S. Markovits of the University of
Michigan reports some such evidence, in an analysis of nearly one thousand articles
written on the United States in Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Focusing on
"non-political" topics such as film, theatre and sports, he found pervasive
condescension and denigration toward American culture. One of his more telling examples
compares European press coverage of the World Cup in the United States (1994) and in Korea
and Japan (2002). In the American coverage even unexpected events that would appear to be
positive (such as 60,000 people watching a match between Saudi Arabia and Morocco on a
weekday afternoon) were reported negatively: such a high turnout only underlined the
naivete and ignorance of the American public. In contrast, the South Korean and Japanese
hosts received rave reviews.
Attitudes toward the United States are too multidimensional for bias to
be an accurate description of most people's views, as expressed either in public opinion
polls or in public discourse. Yet in countries as diverse as China, France, Egypt and
Indonesia, attitudes reflect a pervasive and sometimes institutionalized distrust, which
creates skepticism toward statements by the United States government and a negative
predisposition toward American policy. Overall, the finding of Professor Katzenstein,
myself and our colleagues is that attitudes toward the United States are frequently
better-characterized in terms of distrust than of either opinion or bias.
Tsunami relief as a Quasi-Experiment
Bias is the most fundamental and dangerous form of anti-Americanism. It can be seen as a
form of prejudice and studied in similar ways. Paul Sniderman of Stanford University has
conducted highly original research over the last fifteen years on prejudice, which
distinguishes bias from opinion. In studying prejudice, researchers need to be aware that
respondents sometimes conceal racist views, recognizing that they are not socially
acceptable. Sniderman therefore devised computer-aided polling techniques that ask the
same questions, except for precisely calibrated variations, to two or more experimentally
controlled sets of respondents. In one such experiment, respondents are primed to express
judgments on the behavior of a character in a narrative. For the treatment and control
groups, everything is the same in the narrative except the ethnic affiliation of the
protagonist. In another of Sniderman's experiments, subjects are given lists of things
that make them angry, in such a way that they know that the investigator cannot identify
which particular items they reacted to. But for the treatment group, "affirmative
action" is included in addition to the items listed for the control group. By
computing the mean "angry" responses, the investigator can determine what
proportion of the treatment group reacted angrily to affirmative action. Such an
experimental method could be of great value in distinguishing opinion from bias in
expressions of anti-Americanism.
Lacking data from such an experiment, the worldwide response to the Asian tsunami of
December 26, 2004 at least provides us with a rough quasi-experiment. The tsunami was an
enormous tragedy for millions of people, and it generated an unprecedented outpouring of
empathy and generosity worldwide. President Bush's apparent initial indifference generated
much critical commentary. By January 7, 2005, however, the United States government had
donated $350 million - about eight percent of the amount that had been contributed by all
governments at that time - and had deployed its naval vessels in the area in a massive
relief operation. The U.S. relief effort was focused on Southeast Asia and was not
experienced directly by people in countries outside the region. But the American response
was widely publicized. People's reactions to the American response could, we thought,
serve as a test that would reveal something about people's attitudes.
Fortunately for our analysis, between January 8 and 16, 2005 Global Market Insite (GMI)
conducted a poll of 1000 members of the urban publics in each of 20 countries, which
included questions about the American tsunami relief effort. Since reactions to the U.S.
response to the tsunami were based overwhelmingly not on personal experience but on media
reports, variations in evaluations of the U.S. response are unlikely to reflect different
personal experiences, particularly for publics outside of Asia. Individuals biased in
favour of the United States could be expected to give positive responses when asked about
the reaction of the American government; those biased against the United States could be
expected to give more negative responses.
The GMI poll asked the following question: "The American government has donated $350
million to aid nations impacted by the tsunami, has deployed its military to aid the
region, and has called on former President Clinton and President Bush Sr. to fundraise
more money from the American people. Do you think the American government's reaction to
the tsunami tragedy is adequate?"
The answers to this question were categorized as "agree," "disagree,"
and "don't know/neither." GMI also asked a fairly standard question about the
United States:" Overall, how would you describe your feelings toward the United
States?" The answers to this question were categorized as "positive,"
"negative," or "don/t know/neither."
Table 1 array the data by indicating the difference between "agree" or
"positive," on the one hand, and "disagree" or "negative" on
the other, for each of the twenty countries surveyed on the two questions. Positive
answers indicate net favourable views toward the United States or the American tsunami
relief efforts. Rank orders for each question are in parentheses. The first two columns of
Table 2 seem to suggest that bias - perhaps both for and against the United States - had
an impact on opinions about the adequacy of American tsunami relief efforts. There is an
enormous range of views on the U.S.-led relief effort, disregarding U.S. respondents, who
were overwhelmingly favorable. Sixty-two percent of the Russian public considered American
efforts adequate, as compared to 34 percent who did not; at the other extreme, only 17
percent of the Greek public considered American efforts adequate, as compared to 73
percent who did not. None or almost none of these respondents had any personal experience
of the operation on which they had opinions; they had to be reacting to media coverage,
their own schema, and the nationally prevailing images of the American relief effort.
Table 1. Responses by Country: Favourable/unfavourable to U.S. and
supportive or not of adequacy of the US relief effort (n=20).
Country |
(1) Net
favourable to US: |
(2) Net
supportive of |
(3) Net
supportive of own-country effort: |
69
(1) |
54
(1) |
54
(13) |
|
60
(2) |
-19
(13) |
34
(17) |
|
40
(3) |
11
(6) |
86
(5.5) |
|
33
(4) |
-1
(8) |
88
(3.5) |
|
25
(5) |
-6
(14) |
67
(12) |
|
17
(6) |
-2
(9) |
79
(10) |
|
16
(7) |
-36
(17) |
94
(1) |
|
9
(8) |
13
(3.5) |
86
(5.5) |
|
8
(9) |
12
(5) |
93
(2) |
|
-1
(10.5) |
9
(7) |
84
(8) |
|
-1
(10.5) |
-11
(11) |
10
(19) |
|
-4
(12.5) |
13
(3.5) |
83
(9) |
|
-4
(12.5) |
-9
(10) |
49
(14) |
|
-6
(14) |
-31
(16) |
37
(16) |
|
-8
(15) |
-20
(14) |
85
(7) |
|
-10
(16) |
-13
(12) |
13
(18) |
|
-16
(17) |
-21
(15) |
88
(3.5) |
|
-21
(18) |
-55
(19) |
-14
(20) |
|
-36
(19) |
-54
(18) |
44
(15) |
|
-60
(20) |
-56
(20) |
71
(11) |
Source: Katzenstein and
Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanism in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2006). Original source of data: Global Market Insite report, February 2005.
Notes: Columns 1 and 2: Spearman's r: 0.68 (n=20, p< 0.01, from exact table, 2 - sided
null hypothesis)
Columns 2 and 3: Spearman's r: 0.27 (not significant)
There exists a strong correlation between general views of the United States and views of
the adequacy of American-led tsunami relief efforts, with a Spearman rank order
coefficient well under the 0.01 level of significance. Three of the five publics most
favourably disposed toward the United States in general, rank also among the five most
favourable publics toward the U.S. relief effort, and conversely for the least favourable
publics. This suggests to me that bias is involved - positive or negative.
The third column of Table 1 indicates clearly that, with only a few exceptions, publics
rate their own country's performance highly favourably. Indeed, in about half the
countries, publics are almost unanimously supportive of their own country's effort.
Publics are biased in favour of their own countries' performance. This generalization
applies not only to countries such as Australia, which were generous (over $900 million in
reported public and private donations by January 7) but also to countries that gave almost
nothing, such as Hungary and Russia. And in every case they rate their own country ahead
of the United States which at that time had provided $550 million in reported public and
private donations. In only three countries (Russia, Mexico and Japan) did more than ten
percent of the public both rate U.S. performance as adequate and their own country's
performance as inadequate. Conversely, in no country did less than twenty percent of the
public rate their own country's performance as adequate and the US performance as
inadequate.
We conclude from this analysis that there exists substantial variation in the bias
(positive or negative) toward the United States held by different publics, and that this
variation is strongly correlated with general attitudes toward the United States. Much
more tentatively, we infer that significant cross-national variation in bias exists, with
negative bias particularly pronounced in France and Greece. The evidence is very strong
that publics are positively biased toward their own countries' efforts, in a way that is
consistent with widespread nationalism.
Policy implications
Our findings suggest that the positions on anti-Americanism of both
Left and Right are internally inconsistent. Broadly speaking, the American Left holds that
anti-Americanism as measured by polls is what we define below as opinion rather than bias.
It is largely a reaction to American policy, and indeed, often a justified reaction. The
Left also frequently suggests that anti-Americanism poses a serious long-term problem for
U.S. diplomacy, and that right-wing policies that induce it therefore need to be changed.
But insofar as anti-Americanism reflects ephemeral opinion, changes in policy should be
greeted enthusiastically by those who had earlier expressed negative views toward the
United States. The long-term effects of anti-Americanism should therefore be small, unless
periods of intense negative opinion lead to significant social movements or enduring
institutional change. Conversely, the American Right argues that anti Americanism reflects
a deep bias against the United States: people who hate freedom hate us for what we are.
Yet the Right also tends to argue that anti-Americanism can be ignored: if the United
States follows effective policies, views will follow. But since the essence of bias is the
rejection of information inconsistent with one's prior view, broadly biased foreign
publics should not be expected to change their opinions quickly in response to successes
scored by a country that they fear and detest. Both Left and Right need to rethink their
positions.
The view I take is that most anti-Americanism so far is just opinion,
and not necessarily consequential in the long term. However, the longer opinion remains
negative, the greater the likelihood of moves toward distrust and especially bias.
Distrust and bias are hard to eradicate and could have very serious long-term effects.
II - Types of Anti-Americanism
As I said at the beginning of this talk, anti-Americanism is both
multidimensional and heterogeneous. Drawing on this reality, Professor Katzenstein and I
have identified four major types of anti-Americanism, along with some minor ones that I
will not mention here.
"Liberal anti-Americanism" seems at first to be an oxymoron, since liberals
broadly share many of the ideas that are characteristic of the American creed. But the
United States is often criticized bitterly for not living up to its own ideals. A country
dedicated to democracy and self-determination supported dictatorships around the world
during the Cold War, and continued to do so in the Middle East after the Cold War had
ended. The war against terrorism has led the United States to begin supporting a variety
of otherwise unattractive, even repugnant, regimes and political practices. On economic
issues, the United States claims to favour freedom of trade, but protects its own
agriculture from competition stemming from developing countries, and seeks extensive
patent and copyright protection for American drug firms and owners of intellectual
property. Such behaviour opens the United States to charges of hypocrisy from people who
share its professed ideals but lament its actions.
Liberal anti-Americanism is prevalent in the liberal societies of advanced industrialized
countries, especially those colonized or influenced by Great Britain. No liberal
anti-American ever detonated a bomb against Americans or planned an attack on the United
States. The potential impact of liberal anti-Americanism would be not to generate attacks
on the United States but to reduce support for American policy. The more the United States
is seen as a self interested power parading under the banners of democracy and human
rights, rather than a true proponent of those values, the less willing other liberals may
be to defend it with words or deeds.
Since democracy comes in many stripes, we are wrong to mistake the American tree for the
democratic forest. Indeed, the United States is more atypical than typical. What we denote
as social anti-Americanism derives from a set of political institutions that embed liberal
values in a broader set of social and political arrangements that help define market
processes and outcomes left more autonomous in the U.S. This variant of liberalism is
marked by a more encompassing support for a variety of social programs than those that are
politically feasible or socially acceptable in the United States. Social democratic
welfare states in Scandinavia, Christian democratic welfare states on the European
continent, and developmental industrial states in Asia, such as Japan, are prime examples.
Canada is a particularly interesting case of a polity that has moved in two directions
simultaneously - toward market liberalism U.S.-style under the impact of NAFTA and toward
a more European-style welfare state. In this it mirrors the stance of many smaller
capitalist democracies which are market-liberal in the international economy and social or
Christian democratic in their domestic arrangements.
We designate a third form of anti-Americanism as "sovereign-nationalist." These
anti Americans focus less on correcting domestic market outcomes than on achieving
political power and maintaining national autonomy and identity. The identities of
sovereign nationalists often embody values that are at odds with America's. State
sovereignty thus becomes a shield against unwanted intrusions from America. In varying
proportions, sovereign nationalist anti-Americans emphasize sovereignty, nationalism, and
state power.
China provides a prominent example of sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism. The Chinese
elites and public are highly nationalistic and very sensitive to threats to Chinese
sovereignty. China is already a great power, and has aspirations to become more powerful
yet. Yet it is still weaker than the United States. Hence the superior military capacity
of the United States, and its expressed willingness to use that capacity (for instance,
against an attack by China on Taiwan) create latent anti-Americanism. When the United
States attacks China (as it did with the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in
1999) or seems to threaten it (as in the episode of the EC-3 spy plane in 2001), explicit
anti-Americanism appears quickly. We characterize a fourth form of anti-Americanism as
radical anti-Americanism. It is built around the belief that America's identity, as
reflected in the internal economic and political power relations and institutional
practices of the United States, ensures that its actions will be hostile to the
furtherance of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world. For
progress toward a better world to take place, the American economy and society will have
to be transformed, either from within or without. Radical anti-Americanism was
characteristic of Marxist-Leninist states such as the Soviet Union until its last few
years and is still defining Cuba and North Korea today. Today, radical anti-Americanism is
strongest in parts of the Islamic world. For those holding extreme versions of radical
anti-Americanism, the West, and the United States in particular, are so incorrigibly bad
that they must be destroyed. And since the people who live in these societies have
renounced the path of righteousness and truth, they must be attacked and exterminated.
It should be clear that these four different types of anti-Americanism are not simply
variants of the same schema, emotions, or set of norms, with only slight variations at the
margin. On the contrary, adherents of different types of anti-Americanism can express
antithetical attitudes. Radical Muslims oppose a popular culture that commercializes sex
and portrays women as liberated from the control of men, and are also critical of
secular-liberal values. Social and Christian democratic Europeans, by contrast, may love
American popular culture but criticize the United States for the death penalty, and for
not living up to secular values they share with liberals. Liberal anti-Americanism exists
because its proponents regard the United States as failing to live up to its professed
values - which are entirely opposed to those of religious radicals and are largely
embraced by liberals. Secular radical anti-Americans may oppose the American embrace of
capitalism, but may accept scientific rationalism, gender egalitarianism, and secularism -
as Marxists have done. Anti-Americanism can be fostered by Islamic fundamentalism,
idealistic liberalism, or Marxism. And it can be embraced by people who, not accepting any
of these sets of beliefs, fear the practices or deplore the policies of the United States
III - Polyvalent America and Anti-Americanism
In another chapter that I do not have time to discuss today, Professor Katzenstein and I
argue that there is little evidence, so far, that anti-Americanism - as a set of negative
predispositions toward the United States - has had extensive effects on states policies
and outcomes. Much of the resistance to American foreign policy elsewhere in the world is
just that: resistance to policy, not to America as such.
This finding, along with the ones I have described more fully, leaves us with two puzzles.
First, why does such a rich variety of' anti-American views persist? Second, why do
persistent and adaptable anti-American views have so little direct impact on policy and
political practice? Anti-Americanism generates expressive activity: demonstrating,
marching, waving banners, even symbolically smashing the windows of a McDonald's
restaurant in France. But it is not a political force that frequently overturns
governments, leads American multinational firms to disguise their origins, or propels the
United States government to make major policy changes.
We suggest a single answer to both puzzles. In a phrase, the symbolism generated by
America is so polyvalent that it continually generates and diffuses anti-American views.
The polyvalence of America embodies a rich variety of values. And different values
associated with America resonate differently with the cognitive schemas held by
individuals and reinforced by groups. When polyvalent American symbols connect with
varied, shifting and complex cognitive schemas, the resulting reactions refract like a
prism in sunlight. Many colors appear in the prism, just as America elicits many different
reactions around the world. Often, different components of what is refracted will
simultaneously attract and repel.
Anti- and pro-Americanism have as much to do with the conceptual lenses through which
individuals living in very different societies view America, as with America itself. Iain
Johnstonand Dani Stockmann report that when residents of Beijing in 1999 were asked simply
to compare on an identity difference scale their perceptions of Americans with their views
of Chinese, they placed them very far apart. But when, in the following year, Japanese,
the antithesis of the Chinese, were added to the comparison, respondents reduced the
perceived identity difference between Americans and Chinese. In other parts of the world,
bilateral perceptions of regional enemies can also displace, to some extent, negative
evaluations of the United States. For instance, in sharp contrast to the European
continent the British press and public continue to view Germany and Germans primarily
through the lens of German militarism, Nazi Germany, and World War II.
Because there is so much in America to dislike as well as to admire, polyvalence makes
anti-Americanism persistent. American society is both extremely secular and deeply
religious. This is played out in the tensions between blue "metro" and red
"retro" America and the strong overtones of self-righteousness and moralism that
conflict helps generate. If a society veers toward secularism, as much of Europe has,
American religiosity is likely to become salient - odd, disturbing, and due to American
power, vaguely threatening. How can a people who believe more strongly in the Virgin Birth
than in the theory of evolution be trusted to lead an alliance of liberal societies? If a
society adopts more fervently Islamic religious doctrine and practices, as has occurred
throughout much of the Islamic world during the past quarter-century, the prominence of
women in American society and the vulgarity and emphasis on sexuality that pervades much
of American popular culture are likely to evoke loathing, even fear. Thus anti Americanism
is closely linked to the polyvalence of American society. Anti-Americanism is
heterogeneous and contradictory because American society is so heterogeneous and
contradictory. "You can find anything you want," as Arlo Guthrie sang about
"Alice's Restaurant." On a more intellectual plane, Hannah Arendt made a similar
point when she wrote in 1954 "America has been both the dream and the nightmare of
Europe."
The tropes of anti-Americanism date back to a dialogue about the American character that
started in the aftermath of Columbus's discovery and Thomas More's invention of America in
the 15'" and 16"' centuries. That dialogue is structured by two still to be
resolved questions. Are Americans natural men in a Garden of Eden, operating in an
imaginary space not bounded by geography or time? Or are they barbarians, uncivilized, and
unrestrained in appetites and aspirations that both repudiate and challenge human reason
and experience? French anti Americanism is deeply rooted in the latter conception.
(Franklin story, 1778: Buffon and the Abbé Raynal.) Tocqueville and those who have
followed his trail have vacillated between hope and fear of America. The historian David
M. Kennedy argues that America is seen as an unconstrained place, with great potential for
good or ill.
I began by quoting Henry Luce's prescient statement about the American Century, made
during World War II. I return to Luce at the end. The second half of the 20`" century
indeed inaugurated the American Century, which still continues today. In 1941 the United
States was about to step onto centre stage in world politics, sometimes acting
multilaterally, sometimes unilaterally, always powerfully. During the next 65 years the
United States profoundly shaped the world. Others, wherever they were, had to react,
positively or negatively, to America's impact. Yet during this time, the United States
itself changed fundamentally. In 1941, exports and imports were both near all-time lows.
For twenty years its borders had been virtually closed to immigration, except from Europe.
The South was legally segregated, with African-Americans in an inferior position; and the
North was in fact segregated in many respects. Racism was wide spread in both North and
South. Hence, American soft power was slight - but so was its salience to most potentially
hostile groups and governments abroad. By 2006 both American soft power and hard power had
expanded enormously, and so had its salience to publics around the world. The American
Century created enormous changes, some sought by the United States and others unsought and
unanticipated. Resentment, and anti-Americanism, were among the undesired results of
American power and engagement with the world. Anti-Americanism is as important for what it
tells us about America as for its impact on world politics and American foreign policy. It
poses a threat to America's collective self-esteem. This is no small matter. As Toqueville
observed in the remark I quoted earlier: Americans "appear impatient of the smallest
censure, and insatiable of praise."
The United States is both an open and a critical society. It is also deeply divided. Our
own cacophony projects itself onto others, and can be amplified as it reverberates, via
other societies, around the world. When Americans are polled, they express high levels of
dissatisfaction with many aspects of American society and government policy. But these
expressions of unfavourable opinion are typically not interpreted as anti-American. When
non Americans are polled, similar views are often interpreted as anti-American. Studying
anti Americanism should not lead us to pose the question "why do they hate us?"
To the contrary, studying anti-Americanism should remind us of the old Pogo cartoon
caption: "We have met the enemy, and he is us."
References
Katzenstein, Peter. J. et Keohane, Robert, eds., 2006,
Anti-American in World Politics, Ithaca, Cornel University Press.
Global Market Insite Report, 2005, February.